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ABSTRACT 
 
Contracting has played a central role in the NHS reforms as the principal mechanism by 
which resources are transferred from purchasers to providers.  The nature, process and role of 
contracting are traced by examining the development of government policy on this issue since 
the inception of the reforms.  Much of the emphasis in the early years of the reforms was on 
getting the detail of contracting ‘right’, with attention becoming focused more recently on 
wider commissioning issues and the nature of the purchaser-provider relationship. 
 
The contracting environment is described and consideration is given to the way in which 
changes in this environment have influenced the role and nature of contracting, particularly in 
terms of the tension between the role of the market and the role of management in the NHS.  
Contracts have been used partly as a management tool and partly as a means to promote 
competition, often through the threat of competition (‘contestability’) rather than actually 
switching contracts between providers.  The present government’s stated intention to abolish 
the internal market will lessen the role of contracts as a mechanism to promote competition, 
but within a “system of contestability to force improvements in standards” (Labour Party 
1996).  If contestability is to be used more radically in the NHS, a clearer separation may be 
required between the ownership and operation of assets to address issues of poor provider 
performance.   
 
Longer-term contracts (or agreements) then become the framework within which providers 
operate to meet purchaser service specifications, with an increasing emphasis on quality and 
effectiveness of services, and a decreasing emphasis on annual activity and price negotiations.  
The key challenge will lie in creating an appropriate set of incentives to reward efficient 
providers, and to ensure sufficient flexibility in longer-term agreements to challenge poor 
performance. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The NHS reforms moved the provision of health care services away from a system based on 
hierarchical organisation to one based on contracting between purchasers and providers.  It 
was made clear at the outset that the system was to be purchaser driven, as a former Secretary 
of State (SoS) for Health said, “From first to last it is purchasers who should be in control.  
They pay the piper.  They must call the tune”  (speech to NAHAT 1993).  Purchasing was 
seen as the “engine driving the reforms” and contracting was seen as the “engine house for 
effective purchasing” (NHS Executive 1993). 
 
The contracting process was originally intended to enable purchasers to secure high quality,  
value for money services for their local population, facilitating “change and choice”.  For 
providers, contracts were to provide a stimulus to better performance as the most successful 
would receive a larger share of resources and would be able to invest in providing more and 
better services (Department of Health 1989a). 
 
Despite the new government’s stated intention to replace the internal market with new 
structures which may alter the nature and role of contracting in the future, new policies will 
need to take account of the lessons learned from past experience.  In this paper we consider 
the purpose of contracts in the NHS and the way in which the contracting process has 
changed over time, by tracing policy developments in contracting since the inception of the 
reforms. The form that contracts take and the nature of the process by which they are 
negotiated and monitored are influenced by the environment in which they operate.   
Contracting in the UK has taken place within a highly regulated environment which has 
permeated the contracting process.  By exploring the main issues which have emerged over 
time, we show that whilst there has been a great deal of concern to get the detail of 
contracting ‘right’, attention has also turned to the wider issues concerning the contracting 
environment, particularly the nature of the relationships between purchasers and providers.    
 
The question of whether contracting has been used as a means of promoting competition or as 
a management tool (replacing the hierarchical management processes of the pre-reform NHS) 
is discussed, since contracting is likely to play both these roles to varying degrees.  This again 
reflects the environment in which contracting operates and the conflicts between the role of 
‘market’ versus ‘management’ in the NHS ‘managed market’.  Finally, we outline some of the 
tensions currently emerging in the contracting system which have implications for the future 
direction of contracting, as well as discussing the direction likely to be taken by the new 
government.   
 
Sources of data include published empirical studies, documentation and information from the 
Department of Health and a small scale survey.  The survey took the form of a convenience 
sample in which semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the director of contracting 
or commissioning in five health authorities in the north of England.  The interviews covered a 
range of issues relating to their experience of contracting and their views about the operation 
of the internal market.  The results are used in an illustrative manner rather than as a basis for 
generalisation to the rest of England. 
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2.  WHAT IS AN NHS CONTRACT? 
 
The Oxford Concise Dictionary defines a contract as “a written or spoken agreement between 
two or more parties, intended to be enforceable by law”.  One would  assume they are also 
voluntary agreements, as a party would not enter into the arrangement unless they thought 
they would be better off with, rather than without, the contract. 
 
It is immediately obvious that NHS contracts do not conform to this simple dictionary 
definition (nor to the way in which contracts have been viewed in neo-classical economics). 
Indeed, contracts in what is often referred to as the NHS “quasi-market”, are best viewed as 
“quasi-contracts”.  They are not legally enforceable unless they involve a private sector 
provider (Allen 1995) and disputes are not dealt with through the courts but rather through 
internal arbitration (or, more accurately, conciliation) processes at the regional level, with the 
SoS for Health acting as final conciliator in pre- or post-contract disputes.  
 
They are not strictly voluntary, as the arbitration process allows for intervention in cases 
where it is perceived that one party may be taking advantage of an unequal bargaining 
position ie “if either a purchaser threatened to cease securing services, or a provider 
threatened to cease supplying them, if its terms were not agreed, in circumstances where no 
alternative practical provider or purchaser was available” (EL(91)11). 
 
 
3.  THE CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT 
 
It is not surprising that NHS contracts do not conform to the dictionary definition, as the 
environment into which they were introduced is not the stylised market of economic theory.   
The “mental gymnastics” required in order to sustain the metaphor of the market in the NHS 
has been noted since the outset of the reforms (Hughes and McGuire 1992).  Purchasers and 
providers operate within a framework governed by a high degree of regulation, planning and 
public accountability.   For example, there is a strong management relationship between 
purchasers and the NHS Executive; NHS Trusts have to adhere to public accountability and 
probity standards and their access to public funds for capital development is controlled 
centrally;  and professional self-regulation is widespread. The pursuit of national policy 
objectives provides a framework within which the market operates and directs the behaviour 
of purchasers and providers.   
 
A sense of the extent to which central direction influences local discretion is given by the 
annual “Priorities and Planning Guidance for the NHS” which sets out a national planning 
cycle in which the strategic purpose of the NHS, baseline requirements and objectives and 
medium term (3-5 years) priorities are described.  These are presented in the context of four 
national policies 
1 which affect the overall structure and direction of the NHS, but are aimed 
at defining more specific objectives which must be followed.  For example, in the case of 
cancer services and intensive care services, the type of services to be delivered and the 
structure of the supplier market have been defined recently by the centre and the exercise of 
local choice and decision making in these areas is therefore constrained (EL(96)45).   
 
Central regulation also permeates the contracting process in the NHS.  At the outset of the 
reforms, the Department of Health clarified what contracts should include as a minimum.  
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Contracts were to “cover all aspects of the services to be provided and the expectations of 
both parties.  A fundamental merit of the contract is that it will provide a vehicle to identify 
much more of what health service providers are expected to deliver” (Department of Health 
1989b, page 16).  At a minimum, the contract was expected to cover the following: 
 
♦  nature and level of service provided 
♦  price 
♦  general or specific population characteristics 
♦  facilities to be employed in so far as measures of outcome cannot be substituted 
♦  criteria for admission and discharge and for referrals 
♦  waiting times for access to service 
♦  other measures of quality 
♦  information the parties will make available to each other 
♦  means of monitoring the contract 
♦  mechanics of billing, authorisation and settlement 
 
Particular aspects of the contracting process are governed by central regulations and these are 
detailed below. 
 
3.1 Contract form 
 
It was recognised that different forms of contract would be appropriate for different types of 
services and three types were originally envisaged as operating alongside each other 
(Department of Health 1989c): 
 
Block: An annual fee is paid to the provider in return for access to a defined range of services.  
The contract is viewed as funding a given level of capacity, especially in relation to urgent 
cases and the level of capacity agreed reflects past and expected future number of referrals.   
 
Cost and Volume:  Hospitals receive a sum for a specified base-line level of activity (number 
of cases, treatments) and beyond that level, funding is on a cost per case basis where cost is 
agreed in advance.  The base-line helps hospitals plan and the maximum volume helps Health 
Authorities retain control of expenditure. 
 
Cost per Case:  Used to fund referrals not covered by either of the other types of contract 
types, for instance where the GP or HA does not have a regular contract with the hospital or 
where additional treatments are required outside the contract.  There is no prior commitment 
by either party to the volume of cases involved. 
 
The block contract was intended to provide the starting point for most services in order  to 
reduce the number of contracts which needed to be managed in the early stages and as a way 
of coping with the lack of information on activity and costs which was a feature of the pre-
reform NHS.  The block contract came very close to the pre-reform system of providing a 
sum of money for funding the activity of a hospital throughout a year.  However, the guidance 
stressed that even the simplest of contracts would be more specific than the previous 
arrangements as they would specify how performance and quality was to be measured and set 
out criteria for admission and discharge.  Over time, the block contract was expected to 
incorporate features of the cost and volume contracts, but it was acknowledged that some Contracting in the UK NHS: Purpose, Process and Policy 
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services such as A&E may always need to be provided under a block contract (Department of 
Health 1989b). 
 
The allocation of risk varies with each form of contract.  A simple block contract with no 
volume threshold places the risk of unexpected surges in activity solely with the provider.  
Where volume thresholds are agreed,  providers still bear the risk associated with case-mix as 
they are obliged to treat all patients regardless of the nature of treatment required.  Cost and 
volume contracts pass the risks associated with unanticipated extra activity to the purchasers, 
as do cost per case contracts.  In practice the preferred type of contract will reflect a trade-off 
between the risk-sharing arrangements and the perceived level of transaction costs associated 
with each type of contract.  Other things being equal, the transaction costs are highest for cost 
per case contracts and lowest for block arrangements. 
    
3.2  Pricing in contracts 
 
The pricing regime has been determined centrally and the requirements were set out at the 
beginning of the reforms (EL(90)173).  Contracts were to be generally priced at average cost, 
were to include all costs (overheads, an allowance for depreciation and a 6% return on 
capital) and planned cross-subsidisation between services was prohibited.  Marginal cost 
pricing was allowed only if providers had unplanned spare capacity which purchasers were 
willing to buy. 
 
This level of control on pricing was justified by the Department of Health in terms of the poor 
information base in the NHS.  If providers were to make efficient choices about the nature 
and scale of their ‘production’ and purchasers were to make choices based on comparisons 
between providers, good information was required.  If followed, the rules also ensure that 
providers do not make any profit as their income covers their costs (including the depreciation 
and 6% rate of return), there is no price discrimination between different purchasers and no 
subsidisation of particular services or departments by others.  Under this system, it was 
thought that competition would be encouraged as price variations should reflect relative 
efficiency. 
 
Concerns about the variation in costing methodology used by providers and the inconsistency 
in defining outputs and services, led to the introduction of minimum costing standards and 
also standardised definitions of procedures and services produced by the National Steering 
Group on Costing set up by the Department of Health in 1992 (see section 4.3 for a fuller 
exposition).   
 
3.3  Quality 
 
The initial guidance on contracting acknowledged that it would take time for  a range of 
quality measures to be developed which would be comprehensive but not so “exhaustive as to 
make the contract process unwieldy and the effective monitoring of their achievement 
impractical” (Department of Health 1989b, page 17).  It was envisaged that quality measures 
would fall into five broad categories:  (1) guarantees related to legal requirements or national 
standards; (2) provision of systems to assure quality such as audit and surveys of patients 
opinions; (3) specific standards or key indicators of performance perhaps related to local 
concerns; (4) specific clinical outcome requirements; (5) “common law”, a general 
assumption of standards which could reasonably be expected from a hospital. 
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Purchasers were warned against being “sucked by quality issues into the process of service 
provision” and were thus encouraged to focus on outcome rather than process.  National 
quality standards (eg Patient’s Charter and waiting times targets) have been developed which 
provide a minimum quality requirement in contracts (largely process measures), although 
purchasers and providers are free to incorporate additional local targets.   
 
3.4  Contract duration    
 
The duration of contracts was assumed to vary according to the type of contract and the block 
contract was seen as most critical.  The original guidance stated that, “providers will need 
reasonable security before deploying the necessary resources; purchasers will want to ensure 
continuity of care.  But, too lengthy contracts will ossify the system, depriving both 
purchasers and providers of the flexibility they need” (Department of Health 1989b, page 16).  
Thus,  the block contracts were expected to be 3 year rolling contracts with 12 month 
extensions negotiated annually to ensure that both parties always received at least 2 years 
notice of significant change. 
 
Some idea of the extent of regulation and guidance on specific aspects of contracting can be 
gained by counting the number of pieces of guidance and executive and financial letters 
which have been issues on this topic since the reforms.  Including only those which cover the 
main issues related to contracting, this amounted to six in 1989 and 1990; seven in 1991 and 
1992; six in 1993; eight in 1994; nine in 1995; and seven in 1996 and early 1997.  Although 
some of these consisted only of a few pages of instructions, others were rather more 
substantial and accompanied by more hefty manuals. 
 
 
4.  POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND MAJOR ISSUES IN CONTRACTING 
 
In each of the 4 years from 1992 to 1995, a major review of contracting has been undertaken 
by, or on behalf of, the Department of Health in order to reflect on the experiences of the 
previous contracting round and issue guidance for contracting in the forthcoming year. 
2  
Other reviews and surveys have been undertaken by national organisations representing 
purchasers and providers (eg National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts 
(NAHAT) and the Trust Federation).  Specific guidance has been issued over time in relation 
to particular contracting issues which have arisen.  These reviews and guidance are useful as 
they enable us to trace the main issues with which policy-makers have been concerned and, 
assuming the guidance for the forthcoming year reflects the issues raised by those in the 
service during the previous year, they also provide an insight into the concerns of those 
actually involved in the contracting process and the way in which contracting has evolved 
over time. 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Contract type 
 
Over time there has been a significant  movement away from what was termed “simple” block 
contracts to “sophisticated block” contracts which contain target levels for minimum and 
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maximum levels of activity and trigger mechanisms which are used to initiate defined actions 
(eg re-negotiation procedures) when variances from target are experienced.  These differ from 
cost and volume contracts in that extra payments are not automatically triggered by deviance 
from the threshold levels.  These contracts have the effect of sharing the risk of unexpected 
activity levels between purchasers and providers.   
 
The first national review (EL(92)79) undertaken in 1992 noted the movement towards the 
increasing use of cost and volume contracts and encouraged this for the forthcoming year. 
The Department of Health later stated that no simple block contracts (ie those without floors 
or ceilings) were to be used for the 1995/6 contracting round (Planning and Priorities 
Guidance 1994/5).  It was acknowledged that block contracts may remain appropriate for 
non-acute and community services where information was poor and the contracting currency 
remained problematic, but these were at least to have some form of indicative volume.  This 
was re-iterated in the 1993 and 1994 review (EL(93)103) and EL(94)88). 
 
The latest information on contract type is for 1994/5 and deals only with the “top three” 
contracts from each HA (ie those accounting for large proportion of expenditure): 
 
Simple Block:   5% 
Sophisticated Block:  69% 
Cost and Volume:   25% 
Cost per Case:   1% 
 
This shift has occurred fairly rapidly as an earlier survey in 1991/2 noted that 40% were 
simple  block and 42% sophisticated block. 
 
There is wide variation in the number of contracts held by Health Authorities.  In 1996/7, 
there were 3973 contracts and each health authority held an average of 40 contracts, but this 
ranged from 12 in the Isle of Wight to 136 in West Sussex.  Thirty-eight per cent of all 
contracts are held by purchasers within just two regions - in North and South Thames each 
(NHS Executive, personal communication).  Information on GPFH contracts is scarce.  It is 
estimated that there are 8,000 fundholder contracts in total and on average, each GP contracts 
with four acute providers, although they may have more than one contract in each (NHS 
Executive, personal communication).   As fundholding expands and the range of services 
covered increases, NHS Trusts are dealing with more fundholder contracts.  Between 1992/3 
and 1994/5, the average number of fundholder contracts per Trust increased fourfold to reach 
16, but again the variance is large as some Trusts hold over 100 GPFH contracts (Audit 
Commission 1996). 
 
In addition, over time there has been a move away from contracts at the level of the “whole” 
hospital unit and towards specialty and sub-speciality based contracting (this was supported 
by developments in costing which are discussed below) and the 1994 review required 
purchasers and providers to further break down contracts in case mix by inpatient, outpatient, 
day patient and diagnostic services, with clear costs and volumes for each where possible. 
 
4.2  Managing activity in contracts 
 
There has been significant emphasis on the methods to be used for managing under or over 
performance in terms of the volume of contracted activity.  This can be seen at least in part as 
a response to a spate of incidents (which received heavy media coverage) where hospitals CHE Discussion Paper 156 
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suddenly announced that they would not be treating any more patients for the remaining 
duration of the contract as they had already met or exceeded the contracted level of activity. 
 
In 1993, guidance relating to the management of activity was issued (EL(93)10) and 
subsequent contracting guidance re-iterated this by stressing the need for contracted activity 
to reflect referral patterns and to be profiled to allow for seasonal variation.  Contracts for 
non-emergency work were to contain thresholds and trigger mechanisms.  Monitoring 
procedures and the actions to be taken to get activity back in line or to be re-negotiated were 
to be set out clearly in the contracts.   Some purchasers and providers had agreed early 
warning systems for ‘fast track’ problem solving to deal with ‘hot spots’ of over-activity and 
these were recommended as good practice. 
 
4.3  Pricing, costing and defining the product 
 
As noted earlier, guidance on costing methodology was introduced in response to perceived 
inconsistency in costing and definitions of services.  Concern over inconsistency was reported 
in the first annual survey as purchasers found it difficult to make comparisons and choices.  
Minimum standards for costing were produced in 1993 (FDL (93)59) and costing at the level 
of specialties was required, following a “top down” method of attributing costs.   Indeed, the 
1994 review reported that 16% of contracts amongst the main acute services were already 
being costed at sub-speciality level (eg using major/minor distinctions, procedure pricing or 
some form of banding) 
 
The National Steering Group addressed the issue of consistency in definition by developing 
around 500 Health Resource Groups (HRGs) which allow case-mix differences to be taken 
into account in costing procedures.  HRGs are now routinely recorded items of information on 
diagnoses and procedures and are used to allocate consultant episodes to groups of clinically 
similar conditions with similar costs.   In 1994, guidance was issued which required all acute 
sector providers to cost at least one of three nationally selected acute surgical specialties 
(ophthalmology, gynaecology and orthopaedics) to the level of HRGs by 1995/6 (EL(94)51).   
The 1996/7 guidance extended this requirement to 6 specialties (adding urology, general 
surgery and ENT) and the recommendation for 1997/8 was that HRGs should be costed for all 
surgical specialties and that prices should be available for elective and non-elective work at 
the HRG level within these specialties.  Purchasers and providers are not currently required to 
use costed HRGs as a contracting currency, but they are required to demonstrate that they are 
used to inform contracts by providing comparative cost data.  The lack of standard contract 
currencies was highlighted recently as a cause of much of the extra paper-work and workload 
providers have to undertake in order to prepare for contracting (NHS Executive 1996a).  As a 
result of this, there has been a recommendation that at least for acute services, all Trusts 
should move towards a standard basis for costing and that that this should be used in all 
contracts and on the basis of current evidence, this should be HRGs.  However, this is a 
recommendation only and many purchasers and providers will remain reluctant to use HRGs 
extensively as a contracting currency as there is a lack of clear direction about what future 
developments may be.   At present, the development of Health Benefit Groups (HBGs) which 
group procedures on the basis of similar outcomes are receiving attention. 
 
Whilst the rules relating to costing and pricing are very clear, there has been mounting 
anecdotal evidence that providers are able to disregard these rules, possibly in order to 
discriminate between purchasers or to cross-subsidise between services, especially where the 
provider has a monopoly in some services but faces competition in others.  In addition, there Contracting in the UK NHS: Purpose, Process and Policy 
  8
has been some pressure for relaxation of the rules on the grounds that information on costs 
and prices is much improved and providers no longer require detailed methodological 
procedures for allocation of costs.  Moreover, there has been some criticism of the pricing 
rules, which in combination with rules relating to retention of surpluses, have been argued to 
be provide perverse incentives for efficient behaviour amongst Trusts (Dawson 1994, Propper 
1995).   
 
In response to many of these claims, the Department of Health recently commissioned a 
survey of the actual operation of costing and pricing amongst Trusts (KPMG 1996).  Overall, 
the study indicated quite a high degree of compliance with the national guidance.  More 
complex contracts (cost and volume and cost per case) often involved very sophisticated 
forms of costing and 73% of respondents indicated that their block contracts were costed at, 
or above the level, of sophistication required by the guidance.   The extent to which prices 
were set to be equal to all purchasers and in all contracts was also examined in the survey and 
significant variation was found.  Even where prices were originally set to be equal, they were 
often adjusted post-negotiation, especially in recognition of purchaser affordability and Trusts 
reported that only in around 44% of cases was there no variation between the prices paid by 
their main purchasers.  This fell to 32% of cases for more minor purchasers and 35% for 
GPFHs. 
 
In response to these findings and further consideration of the costs and benefits of the current 
pricing regime, the review group concluded that the cost=price relationship should be retained 
for the time being but dispensed with if a number of conditions could be met in respect of 
development of the internal market.  The latter includes steps to increase price transparency 
and consistency in costing methods and the definition of products, on the grounds that this 
would facilitate the detection of attempts to exploit monopoly power through pricing (NHS 
Executive 1996b). 
 
4.4  Duration of contracts 
 
Each year, central guidance has “encouraged” purchasers and providers to consider the use of 
rolling block contracts and longer term fixed contracts with provisions for early termination 
where “appropriate”.  GPFHs reported difficulties in committing resources for longer than 
one year as their budget-holding status is only confirmed on an annual basis, but they were 
encouraged to state their intentions within a longer timeframe, even if the contracts were 
always of one year duration. 
 
The 1995 review reported that GPFHs and HAs saw the benefits of longer term contracts in 
certain circumstances, especially in relation to achieving strategic change over a period of 
time.  Ten HAs had 2-3 year rolling contracts for all acute services and one had used a five 
year contract to facilitate acute sector reconfiguration.  Some 10 year contracts existed for 
specific services such as nursing home care where continuity was important.  Our survey 
3  
found that purchasers often have longer term contracts with voluntary organisations as these 
tend to be small organisations which depended almost solely on the contract as their main 
source of income and would find it impossible to employ all their staff on annual contracts. 
 
Concern about the level of transaction costs prompted a recommendation that purchasers and 
providers move towards the wider use of longer contracts and a suggestion that the 
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Department might issue targets for purchasers to commit expenditures in this way.  In reality, 
it is not clear how much the use of longer contracts would actually reduce transaction costs, 
especially if activity and price were re-negotiated each year in detail.  One purchaser in our 
survey noted that whilst their 3 year contracts are not about saying “here is the money, see 
you in 3 years”, they were sufficiently confident with good quality providers to make the 
commitment and flex activity and expenditure very slightly each year, thus avoiding intense 
annual re-negotiations.  Other advantages of longer term contracts have been identified by 
both the Department of Health and those involved in contracting (eg longer term strategic 
developments, sharing risk), so this development may bring additional benefits. 
 
In practice, some purchasers see the annual resource allocation cycle as an obstacle to the use 
of LTCs.  For example, in our survey, purchasers reported that they may indeed commit to 
buying a range of services from a provider for more than one year, but that “it doesn’t avoid 
that annual round of what exactly do you buy, how much are you willing to pay for it and 
what changes do you want to negotiate”.   The annual contracting timetable, annual pay 
awards and annual inflation allowances are seen as re-inforcing the shorter term outlook in 
many cases.   
 
4.5  Involvement of health care professionals in contracting 
 
The 1993 contracting survey revealed that despite earlier guidance emphasising the 
importance of involving health care professionals in contracting, clinicians still felt they were 
not fully involved in contracting.  The following year, the involvement of clinicians was made 
a requirement in the annual planning and priorities guidance and the next contracting review 
reported that in 58% of main contracts, clinicians were involved at some stage in the 
contracting process.   Of those that involved clinicians, 60% reported that the involvement 
had made a difference in some way.  The message has been reinforced by special guidance on 
involving clinicians following a task force set up to address these issues (EL(90)221). 
 
In common with the 1995 national review, our survey found that most purchasers recognised 
the importance of involving clinicians in particular aspects of contracting if they were to 
ensure that contracts were realistic and could be delivered by those actually responsible for 
providing the service.  Some commented that it was a mistake to try to involve clinicians in 
the “bureaucratic wrangling”, but that they should be heavily involved in the specification of 
services and the management of activity in-year.  The importance of fostering a dialogue 
between GPs and the clinicians within Trusts was also seen as essential for managing the 
balance between elective and emergency work.   
 
 
 
4.6  Working relationships and the balance of power 
 
In the early stages of the reforms, the language surrounding contracting tended to depict 
purchasers and providers as being opponents battling through tough contract negotiations, 
each trying to score points at the expense of the other party.  This may have been in part a 
result of the attempt by the government to separate the roles and to make it clear that the old-
style provider no longer existed.  The new purchaser was to be one step removed from the 
provision of health care and had a new role in identifying services required to meet the health 
needs of its resident population (Department of Health 1989c).   
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The NHS was reminded that an “element of competition between providers and also between 
purchasers is vital for change” and that purchasing is not about “protecting the income of 
local providers” (NHS Executive 1993).   Many Trusts seem to have engaged in quite strong 
marketing exercises and purchasers in our survey noted that, “some Trusts have been 
extremely macho.  They have been looking to develop contracts all over the place, some many 
miles from their own patch.” 
 
Equally, on the purchasing side, the HAs felt the need to flex their muscles, especially as 
there was a perception that many of the key staff from the pre-reform NHS originally chose to 
work on the providing rather than the purchasing side, giving the providers the advantage in 
terms of information on services and the local area.  Purchasers may have felt the need to 
signal that they were not prepared to be out-manoeuvred by the providers and would not be 
drawn into a provider-led, rather than a purchaser-led, NHS.  The tendency for providers to 
drive service development and expect purchasers to pay was noted by most of the purchasers 
in our survey who felt this often was the cause of duplication and over-provision of services 
in the early days.  For example, “there was a culture of some providers initiating service 
developments and changes without purchaser approval on the basis of ‘you have got to pay 
for it or stop your patients coming’” and, in relation to the duplication of cardiology services 
by two local Trusts, one purchaser remarked that “..[the Trusts] are not funded for it, they 
just develop it.  They are not based on a business plan, no clinical effectiveness has been 
satisfied, it is just ad hoc...It is marketed directly to GPs, it becomes out of control and what 
you then face is a bill for developments”.   It was clear that some purchasers felt that only 
now were they beginning to take control over the situation and become “more systematic and 
assertive about [their] role and that has fundamentally shifted the balance of power”. 
 
However, almost simultaneously and certainly in more recent years, the need for 
collaboration and the development of longer term relationships has also been emphasised.  
The 1993 contracting review noted that purchasers and providers needed to work together and 
share risks and many examples of collaborative working were found by the 1995 review, 
although some respondents identified that “power games” still hindered collaborative work in 
some cases.  In defining the elements of successful purchasing, ministers stated that “mature 
relations with providers” were essential and that although the reference to the 
purchaser/provider “split” was seen as useful in defining roles, the image of a stand-off 
relationship was unwanted (NHS Executive 1993).  Ideally, they were looking for “creative 
tension and robust negotiation” whilst recognising that relations in the private sector are 
governed by partnership and longer term relationships. Instances of contracting characterised 
by “posturing” were frowned upon.   
 
Whilst this shift may reflect changes in political context, it is likely to also be a consequence 
of the increasing familiarity of purchasers and providers with their new roles and acceptance 
of the need to work together in order to facilitate structural change and achieve national and 
local policy objectives.  In our survey, all the purchasers agreed that relationships had 
matured and that the days of the “macho-purchaser” and independent provider were “well 
past their sell-by date”.  The framework within which contracting is undertaken is 
characterised by the sort of relational contracting found in other sectors, “It is about 
nurturing...if you have a good provider you want to work with them..it is a constant process..it 
is a dialogue based system” and “A key to anything happening is that relationships are 
sound...you don’t have to like each other...... but the relationships have to recognise that we 
are all part of the same NHS”.  This is supported by the study of contracting undertaken by 
Flynn et al (1997) in which HAs said they favoured collaborative relationships and that trust CHE Discussion Paper 156 
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was central to these relationships.  However, they also noted a certain tension between 
aspirations and the reality as the role of trust in the relationships was often “precarious and 
volatile”.  This was also reflected by the purchasers in our study as they noted that some 
aspects of adversarial behaviour existed and  that some Trusts still had a very “predatory” 
style,  behaving opportunistically wherever possible.  
 
In summary, many of the issues which have emerged over time have been related to clarifying 
the ‘rules of the game’ and have concerned the detailed mechanics of contracting such as 
what form of contract should be used, appropriate pricing and costing methods, 
standardisation of the definition of the product and managing activity within the contract.  
However, some attention has also been paid to the wider environment in which contracting 
takes place, who should be involved in contracting and the nature of the relationship between 
purchasers and providers. 
 
 
5.  COMPETING BY MANAGING OR MANAGING BY COMPETING? 
 
The NHS reforms were one element in a much wider policy of ‘rolling back the State’ in 
order to contain rising public expenditure and to make public services more accountable to 
users.  The introduction of elements of the private sector into public sector services was seen 
as a means of combining the disciplines of the market with the values of the welfare state 
(Flynn and Williams 1997).  Different measures and degrees of “privatisation” were applied, 
ranging from the transformation of the nationalised utilities into regulated private profit-
making enterprises to changes in the organisational structures of a number of public sectors 
including housing, education and  social services.   In common with other sectors, the method 
of allocating resources in health care was changed from a hierarchical bureaucracy within a 
vertically integrated “firm” to a quasi-competitive system of contractual arrangements 
between purchasers and providers within an internal market.   
 
A strictly neo-classical view of markets and competition would perceive of NHS purchasers 
making fully informed purchasing decisions based on unrestricted choice between competing 
providers, taking into account the price and quality characteristics of the health care 
“product”.   Some elements of this approach were apparent in the early stages of the reforms 
where the emphasis was on the importance of competition between hospitals, as a means to 
enhance responsiveness and efficiency eg “ ..self-government for hospitals...supported by a 
funding system in which successful hospitals can flourish, will encourage local initiative and 
greater competition.  All this in turn will ensure a better deal for the public, improving the 
choice and quality of the services offered and the efficiency with which those services are 
delivered“ and “competition with other hospitals, where it is effective, should also constrain 
costs” (Department of Health 1989a, pages 22 and 24). Early policy statements at the start of 
the reforms stressed the potential for those hospitals which best meet the needs and wishes of 
patients to get the money to continue to do so and for hospitals which offer the best value for 
money to be rewarded (Department of Health 1989a).  Purchasers were envisaged as defining 
what they required on the basis of comprehensive health needs assessments, and “if the 
provider does not deliver satisfactory value for money for patients, consider moving your 
health care business elsewhere.  The whole point of the internal market in the NHS is that 
purchasers should be able to use the threat of competition..” (NHS Executive 1993). 
 
However, conventional approaches to competition and the nature of contracting are restrictive 
and there has been a recent convergence from a number of different perspectives about the Contracting in the UK NHS: Purpose, Process and Policy 
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role of collaboration, social networks and trust in understanding contractual relationships.  
Rather than being seen as mechanistically enforced documents, explained in terms of 
individual motives alone, contracts (and other forms of economic exchange) are seen as being 
embedded in ongoing networks of social relations (Granovetter 1992; Granovetter and 
Swedberg 1992).  Thus contracts are seen as “relational” where parties recognise their mutual 
dependence and the contract is a method of adapting to changing circumstances over time.   
Empirical work in industries characterised by longer term relationships between purchasers 
and suppliers has illustrated the importance of extra-legal sanctions, unwritten rules, social 
pressures and norms as a basis for contractual relationships which are  based on trust and 
reputation with repeat trading (eg Arighetti et al, 1996, Burchell and Wilkinson 1996, 
Macaulay 1963, Beale and Dougdale 1975).  Similarly, research has shown that markets 
dominated by small numbers of large organisations, and where buyers and sellers have to 
make investments, the value of which depends upon a continued relationship, are likely to be 
characterised by long term social relationships and co-operative processes (eg Crocker and 
Masten 1988, Joskow 1987, Goldberg and Erickson 1987).   
 
Additionally, some of the literature on organisational change suggests that reorganisations in 
the public sector may fail to deliver change in the long-term as once the immediate political 
pressures at the time of the change are relaxed,  old-style behaviours will re-emerge.  In the 
context of the NHS this might suggest that whilst the language and rhetoric of the market 
remains, the contracting process is used as a mask and merely serves to reinforce the pre-
reform allocation and management processes (Bennet and Ferlie 1996). 
 
Does this suggest that contracting has not been used in order to promote competition in the 
NHS?   It has always been recognised that the scope for competition in the NHS is 
constrained by the fact that some of the conditions which facilitate competition in other 
markets, such as the existence of spare capacity, are difficult to maintain within a publicly 
funded system where duplication and spare capacity can be viewed as a sub-optimal use of 
resources.  Additionally, for the most part, providers are working within a “zero-sum” game 
as the fixed budgets within which purchasing operates implies that for every “winner” there 
will be a “loser” 
4.   The potential for economies of scale and scope in the provision of some 
health care services is also often put forward as a reason to expect the supply of many health 
care services to be dominated by monopoly providers, although the evidence for the existence 
of these economies is patchy (Effective Health Care Bulletin 1996).  Empirical work which 
has attempted to measure the degree of competition on the supply-side in the UK has been 
very limited.  A study of the degree of concentration in the ‘market’ for general surgery in 
1991/2 in one region in England concluded that there were signs of competition emerging but 
highlighted the serious methodological difficulties associated with the study (Appleby et al 
1994).  Subsequent studies have attempted to explore the relationship between the degree of 
competition (using concentration indices) and prices and the expected negative relationship 
has been found to be rather weak in some cases (Propper 1996; Propper and Wilson 1996; 
Propper and Bartlett 1997) and more strongly in others (Csaba 1997).  
 
Moreover, in a regulated market like the NHS it is clear that significant changes in the nature, 
location or scope of services will only be allowed to occur as part of a managed process, 
rather than purely as a result of the unconstrained operation of market forces.   Although 
purchasers were expected to have the freedom to choose between providers and to direct their 
                                                           
4   Although there is some scope for expansion of the size of the “pie” through access to private rather than 
public funds CHE Discussion Paper 156 
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business only towards those who met their requirements and fulfilled their contracts, it 
became clear very quickly that the combined actions of a few purchasers or a significant 
contracting shift from a key purchaser could potentially “de-stabilise” a provider and threaten 
its long-term viability.  The tension between encouraging change, which was one of the key 
purposes of the reforms, and ensuring that this change occurred within a managed framework 
to minimise unpredicted or “undesirable” results has permeated policy.  Whilst purchasers 
were berated for “cosy relationships” aimed at maintaining the status quo, they were also 
exhorted to ensure that change should be planned and that there should be “no surprises” ( 
NHS Executive 1993).   
 
To this end, policy has emphasised the need for purchasers to give adequate notice to their 
providers (and also to purchasers who share the services of that provider), of “significant” 
changes in contracting intentions.   In 1994, purchasers were required to produce five-year 
plans in addition to the usual annual plans and the former were aimed at developing strategic 
intentions over time.  In the context of these, purchasers were required to signal major shifts 
at least eighteen months in advance and changes at the margin at least six months before the 
start of the contracting year.   Similarly, providers were intended to signal changes in their 
costing methods well in advance so that purchasers did not face unexpected large price 
changes.  
 
Empirical evidence based on studies of the contracting process is thin on the ground, but a 
few case studies of contracts for specific services have been undertaken.  An examination of 
contracting for HIV/AIDS services from 1993-95 concluded that competition was rather 
patchy and that rather than picking and choosing between service options, purchasers seemed 
to prefer to encourage co-operation.  However, purchasers did appear to be using the contract 
process to mould services in new directions and commission new services where necessary 
(Bennet and Ferlie 1996).  In a study of contracting for community health services, the 
purchasers stressed the importance of the “localness” of services and thus concluded that it 
would be difficult to see any real competition, although they felt there was scope for 
competition “at the edges” of geographical areas (Flynn et al 1997).   Purchasers in our 
survey saw that the ability to move contracts or to threaten to move them, had provided them 
with a powerful mechanism for change, especially in relation to services which were poor 
quality and for new services.   For example, “[we have]  shifted providers in a positive way.  
You now have a formal mechanism whereas pre-reform there was not..if you were sat here 
and did not like the local services, there was no way of shifting the money.”  Similarly, “the 
exercise of real choice about providers [is] when you are developing a new service or 
changing the pattern of use for a service.” and “you wouldn’t think 5 years ago of moving 
services or telling people to lower costs or improve quality....[but now] we have moved 
services, costs have come down and quality has improved in some cases”.  However, this was 
tempered by the recognition that for some services, providers have local monopolies, “there 
can be a lot of [talk]  about shifting stuff around for which there is no reality....people want 
local services”. 
 
Data from the Department of Health estimating the proportion of purchaser expenditure 
contracted with providers from within the boundaries of the HA, illustrates in part the extent 
to which contracts are being moved around (NHS Executive, personal communication) 
5.   
Between 1991/2 and 1992/3, this ranged from an increase in “within-DHA” purchasing of 
                                                           
5   It is not possible to draw firm conclusions from these data as those purchasers with more than one local 
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23% to a decrease of 38%, which suggests that at least some change is being made in terms of 
the providers with whom contracts are let.   However, given that many purchasers will have 
little choice about where to place most contracts for non-elective services, it is not surprising 
that in 1994/5, 88% of main contracts were held by providers within the HA boundaries of 
the purchaser.   Even if purchasers are not actually moving contracts around, this does not 
necessarily imply that competition or the threat of competition is not operating.  Purchasers 
in our survey recognised this and often used the threat of switching as a way of forcing 
providers to improve quality.  In one example, the local GPFHs had indicated that they were 
contemplating moving a chiropody contract from a poorly performing provider and the HA 
followed suit and said that if they did not improve by the following year, they would also 
move.  The service had improved greatly by the end of the contractual period and the contract 
remained with the incumbent provider. 
 
Market testing exercises where services are formally put out for tender by purchasers clearly 
involves an element of competitive bidding between alternative providers.  Although most 
market testing activity has tended to be undertaken within Trusts in terms of the provision of 
non-clinical services, there has been experience in relation to the market testing of clinical 
services and some purchasers have found this to be a useful way of comparing the prices and 
quality of services offered by alternative providers in a more formal way before awarding a 
contract.   A review of contracts in 1993/4 revealed that almost 40% of providers had been 
involved in tendering and another 20% expected to be in the following year (Appleby 1994).  
Experiences related in the annual contracting reviews suggest that most market testing 
activity has been focused on services with which purchasers were dissatisfied and this was 
confirmed by purchasers in our surveys who noted that  “we have tendered services that we 
have been concerned about” and “on the few occasions when competitive tendering has been 
used it has been used on services that really did need a kick up the backside.  Emerging out of 
that has been a substantially improved service.”   
 
If contracts are used in conjunction with a non-competitive environment, this raises the 
problem of how they are made to be effective if they are used merely as a means of trying to 
manage providers.  The use of sanctions and incentives in contracts has been fairly limited to 
date and largely confined to financial penalties on the provider for failure to provide the 
required data for contract monitoring purposes (Spurgeon et al 1997).  Even if sanctions are 
used more widely, they will have very little teeth unless the purchaser can make a credible 
threat to switch the contract if providers fail to comply.  Where purchasers are faced with 
monopoly providers of particular services and little chance of moving the contract elsewhere, 
the importance of contestability  rather than competition can be seen.  Whilst in some 
circumstances it may be feasible to have only a single provider of a service in the market at 
one time, perhaps because local access is key or because an efficient level of production can 
be achieved only through having one larger provider rather than several smaller ones, this 
does not imply that the provider automatically continues to receive the contract if 
performance has been  unsatisfactory, as long as there can be competition for the market at 
this time. 
 
If contestability is to be used more radically in the NHS, this might require clearer separation 
of the ownership and operation of assets.   Trusts tend to behave as if they own the hospital 
assets whereas in reality they are owned by the SoS who has the power to divest a Trust of 
these assets and pass them into the control of alternative management. Thus, at least in theory,  
a poorly performing Trust could be made to relinquish the assets involved in the provision of 
a service and allow another management or clinical team to bid for the contract to operate the CHE Discussion Paper 156 
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services.  This mirrors the situation in many of the regulated privatised utilities in the UK - 
for example, the privatisation of the railways has taken the form of monopoly ownership of 
the track whilst the franchises for running the service have been awarded in a competitive 
process.   
 
Whilst there may be many practical problems in putting this into action into the NHS, not 
least the availability and willingness of alternative managers and clinicians to bid for such 
contracts
6, it is a potential answer to the problem of using contracts effectively in 
circumstances where competition is limited.  Indeed, despite the Labour Party’s avowed 
intentions to “abolish” the competitive internal market, their pre-election speeches recognised 
the need to address poor provider performance and Chris Smith stated that purchasers could 
use a “system of contestability to force improvements in standards” (Labour Party 1996).  As 
they also claim that this would address the deficit in the current system whereby a new 
purchaser could come in and use a sub-standard service even if it has been rejected by others, 
the implication is that contestability would be used to replace wholesale those responsible for 
the poor performance, be they managers or clinicians or at the very least to force them to 
come up to standard through the threat of replacement.  However, we await clarification from 
the current SoS about the role of contestability. 
 
Purchasers also recognise the value of having comparative information on price and quality of 
services from different providers, even where this does not change their purchasing pattern as 
they see it as a useful tool which can improve leverage.  Purchasers in our survey noted that 
comparisons could be made within a city, a region or even nationally and that they had put 
considerable time and effort into bench-marking activities which they saw as improving their 
negotiating position with providers.  Improvements in the availability and quality of 
comparative information was seen as a priority by some. 
 
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that in some circumstances purchasers have used the 
contracting mechanism as a means through which they can stimulate competition and bring 
about change.  This is seen most sharply where purchasers are developing new services or 
have identified that the service they are getting is very poor.  In other circumstances, 
purchasers have used the threat of competition as a means of improving services, but this is 
not necessarily reflected in changes in their purchasing patterns as the incumbent providers 
are often able to meet the purchaser’s requirements and the contract remains with them as a 
result.  In the NHS there are limits on the extent to which it is possible to have competition in 
the market for some services, especially those where local access is essential and where 
economies of scale and scope exist and, in these cases, it is more difficult to make contracts 
effective.  Making these services contestable at the time of contract renewal is one potential 
solution, but sharper separation of the ownership and operation of assets would be required if 
this method is to be used successfully.  That contracting seems to be used to promote 
competition and achieve change in some circumstances and not others, is perhaps a reflection 
of the inherent conflict in a ‘managed market’ like the NHS where there is a balance to be 
struck between the relative roles to be played by the ‘market’ and by ‘management’.  This 
theme is also apparent in some of the current tensions in contracting. 
 
 
                                                           
6   There may be a severe supply constraint in terms of the numbers of clinicians within certain specialties who 
are available to take over the running of another service and, perhaps more importantly, the willingness of 
clinicians to venture into the territory of their colleagues given the close professional networks which exist. Contracting in the UK NHS: Purpose, Process and Policy 
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6.  CURRENT TENSIONS IN CONTRACTING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
FUTURE DIRECTION OF CONTRACTING 
 
6.1   Equity 
 
Around half the population is now covered by some form of fundholding which accounts for 
15% of total expenditure in the hospital and community health services sector (Audit 
Commission 1996).  Recent changes have moved primary care in a number of geographical 
areas towards total fundholding where GPs manage the budget for all services.    
 
Although fundholding was viewed by the previous government as one of the successes of the 
NHS reforms, the potential impact on patients in terms of equity has been the subject of 
debate.  Media reports and anecdotal evidence have suggested that some NHS Trusts offer 
preferential treatment to patients of GPFHs compared with patients funded through the HA, 
hence allegations of ‘two-tierism’ have arisen. The incentive for the Trusts to engage in such 
behaviour is to gain additional income by slowing down activity covered by block contracts 
with HAs (thus increasing waiting times for these patients), whilst increasing activity through 
cost per case contracts with GPFHs.  Additionally, Trusts seem keen to retain the business of 
fundholders, perhaps as they are perceived as being willing and able to shift their contracts 
around if they are unhappy with the service provided.  Early evidence did indeed suggest that 
GPFHs were willing to switch, generally on quality grounds (Glennerster et al 1994; Mahon 
et al 1994), but there also seems to have been a decrease over time in the extent to which 
GPFHs refer to hospitals outside their district (Coulter and Bradlaw 1993), although of course 
this could hide switching within-district for some services.   A more recent survey confirmed 
that the majority of fundholders had made no major changes to where they referred (Audit 
Commission 1996). 
 
Examples of Trusts cancelling outpatient appointments and routine surgery for patients of 
non-fundholding GPs have been cited as evidence that two-tierism is rife (Labour Party 
1996).   Examples and complaints of two-tier treatment have been widely reported (eg 
McCullough 1993; Samuel 1992; Luxton 1993; Association of Community Health Councils 
1994), but systematic evidence is not available (Dixon and Glennerster 1995).   Comparisons 
of access for fundholding and non-fundholding  patients would have been needed for firm 
conclusions to be drawn.  A study of outpatient and inpatient waiting times in one region 
found no differences in the length of wait for patients of fundholders and non-fundholders, 
casting doubt on the two-tier theory (Coulter 1995).   
 
The perceived inequity of this system explains in part the pre-election proposals from the 
Labour Party to replace fundholding with GP-led local commissioning, involving all GPs.  
These groups would vary in size, so each HA would have between 5 and 15 groups which 
would receive a budget covering all aspects of care and would work with the HA to decide 
where contracts or “agreements” would be placed.   The “health action zones” recently 
mentioned by the SoS fit this model.  However, although entry to the eighth wave of GP 
fundholding has been deferred by the government, it is now not clear what direction 
purchasing will take in the future other than to retain the primary care focus and to be based 
on what works for particular local areas rather than on a single model across the country.  
Hence a number of primary care pilot site projects are being established in accordance with 
the Primary Care Act 1997, with an explicit evaluation framework (NHS Executive 1997). 
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6.2  Managing demand 
 
Whilst HAs have the responsibility for placing contracts for services, they do not play a role 
in generating or managing demand for those services.  GPs are the source of most referrals to 
the acute and the community sector and tertiary referrals to a Trust providing more specialist 
care are often initiated by the Trust currently dealing with the patient. Fundholders are 
responsible for paying for referrals they make for those services covered by their funds, whilst 
the HA is responsible for those services not included in the fund and for services for all non-
fundholders.  Non fundholders are expected to refer patients to hospitals with which the HA 
has a contract (so HAs are intended to set contracts by consulting local GPs and examining 
referral patterns),  but in order to preserve the clinical freedom of doctors to decide if they 
require the services of a hospital with which the HA does not have a contract, the system of 
Extra-Contractual Referrals (ECRs) was created.   Under this system, the HA in which the 
patient lives will reimburse the provider if a referral is made which is not covered in a 
contract.  The need for prior notification of emergency and tertiary ECRs and more recently, 
of elective ECRs, has been removed with the intention of reducing bureaucracy [EL(96)56 
and EL(96)94].  Although the costs of ECRs represent a small proportion of HA expenditure 
overall (just under 2%), this expenditure is unpredictable and HAs need to retain reserves in 
order to ensure they can meet their ECR bill.   
 
Purchasers have tended to view the demand for health care services as an external hazard over 
which they have no control and have focused their attention on aspects of supply instead.  
Thus in many parts of the country, the impetus for merger and rationalisation of Trusts has 
come from purchasers who are keen to control supply in order to influence demand indirectly.  
However, recent policy developments are aimed at getting purchasers to take more control 
over demand.  HAs have been urged to discuss ECR flows and referral patterns with local 
GPs in order to draw up local protocols clarifying the circumstances and the manner in which 
GPs should refer outside of contracts (EL(96)94).  The purpose of this to create a greater 
understanding of the process between HAs and GPs in order to influence demand and 
facilitate efficient contracting.  Similarly, innovative contractual arrangements which tie 
clinical and budgetary responsibility for tertiary referrals together have been encouraged.  As 
well as ensuring seamless care across institutional boundaries, these sub-contracting models 
can also encourage efficient referral practices, as the Trusts in which the clinician making the 
referral is based are also responsible for payment for the referral. 
Other developments aimed at controlling demand have been emphasised heavily both within 
and outside the contracting process.  For example, prioritisation has been seen as a major role 
for purchasers, and in some cases this has led to the development of ‘contract exclusions’: 
procedures and treatments which HAs state they will not normally fund (eg gender 
realignment, cosmetic plastic surgery, pregnancy testing, some types of fertility treatment), 
although there is usually a caveat to cover cases where there are strong medical grounds (eg 
Redmayne et al 1993, Redmayne 1995).  Some new and unevaluated treatments such as 
homeopathy have also been excluded by particular HAs.   
 
Tight budget constraints for both purchasers and providers are unlikely to disappear in the 
future, thus policy aimed at increasing control over demand will probably continue. However, 
the Labour government may be less willing to allow explicit rationing to take place at the 
level of the HA as this has often led to geographical inequity in the range of treatments 
funded by the HA which are available to local populations.    Instead they have suggested that 
there will be a clearer national framework for service priorities based on clinical evidence of 
effectiveness (Labour Party 1996). Contracting in the UK NHS: Purpose, Process and Policy 
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6.3  Differentiation of roles 
 
In defining the roles of the purchaser and provider in the new NHS, the Department of Health 
emphasised the importance of the distancing of the purchaser from decisions about the 
process of production of health care services: “the changing role of DHAs from service 
managers to service purchasers will increasingly mean that they will concentrate on what 
services their residents need without specifying in detail how each service is to be provided” 
(Department of Health 1989b).  This simple model suggests that contracts specify precisely 
what is required and providers bid in order to win the contract and provide the service 
specified.  However, the degree to which this is possible is governed by the ability of 
purchasers to specify their requirements in terms of health outcomes rather than process 
measures or intermediate outcomes. Although there has been some movement in this 
direction, purchasers are still not in a position to specify outcomes for the vast majority of 
services. 
 
The need to continue, at least in the medium term, to focus on process measures has perhaps 
accentuated the difficulties experienced by some purchasers in becoming embroiled in the 
detail of how providers deliver the services required and the operational problems of their 
main providers.  There is an important distinction to be made between purchasers’ concerns 
that providers take note of available evidence relating to clinical and cost-effectiveness (and 
there is increasing evidence that purchasers require providers to follow treatment protocols 
and best practice guidance), which may be viewed as a key part of the purchasing process; 
and the involvement in detailed discussions about how providers handle internal cost 
pressures.   
 
Purchasers and providers frequently appear to be at odds in their approach to this dilemma, as 
providers often argue that purchasers fail to realise that they must be involved at this level, 
whilst some purchasers argue that they are involved inappropriately.  For example, some 
purchasers in our survey noted that although in theory the contract allows them to agree a 
quantity of service for a given price and let the Trusts decide how to organise inputs as this is 
what they are paid to manage, “....that theory is a long way from reality because each year we 
are faced with contract negotiations around the problems that Trusts have got in terms of 
delivering the service” and “in an ideal world we don’t buy any nurses or doctors or pieces 
of equipment - we buy a service - but we are nowhere near being able to hold that line and 
hand that problem back to them”. The dilemma is also reflected in national policy which 
initially viewed purchasers as focusing on service specifications and letting Trusts manage 
their difficulties, but has later suggested that  purchasers need to “share ownership” of 
provider difficulties, particularly the in-year pressures (EL(93)103).   
 
There is a balance to be struck between on the one hand acknowledging that providers are 
faced with national and local pressures which may raise costs or make the current 
configuration of services inappropriate, thus requiring a degree of collaboration with 
purchasers and joint decision-making on service provision; and a need to ensure that 
purchasers do not get drawn back into a pre-reform system of involvement in issues which 
Trusts should be addressing themselves.  This problem is clearly not new: indeed, it could be 
argued that as time passes purchasers are less likely to get involved in Trust issues as the old-
style management involvement is replaced by new attitudes and approaches.   However, it 
appears that current circumstances have highlighted the dilemma as there is a  perception that 
the 1996/97  contracting year has been the toughest since the reforms (NAHAT 1996).  This 
is being attributed to a growing financial gap between the funds available to purchasers and CHE Discussion Paper 156 
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the extra costs to providers of meeting purchaser demands for efficiency gains and 
improvements in quality, but more importantly, of meeting various national policies (such as 
limits on junior doctor hours) which have cost implications.   Hence, Trusts may feel that they 
need to make purchasers aware of each cost pressure and management issue in order to justify 
requests for additional funding, although purchasers faced with limited funds themselves 
become frustrated that Trusts’ income expectations far outweigh the available funds. 
 
6.4  Contracting, purchasing and commissioning     
 
It is now almost a stylised fact that the early days of contracting were dominated by what was 
seen by some to be an inappropriate level of attention to detail and content at the expense of 
an overall strategic outlook.  The government at the time stated that the first two years of the 
reforms had been focused on safeguarding the provider base and achieving the separation of 
purchasers and providers.  After that, attention turned to the importance of ‘purchasing’, with 
the emphasis on how purchasing was concerned with forcing the pace of change in the health 
service and moving away from services based  on historical patterns, service inputs and 
institutions (NHS Executive 1993).  The word ‘purchasing’  seemed to be used to distinguish 
the wider responsibilities that HAs had for identifying the health needs of their population and 
specifying the services required to meet those needs, from ‘contracting’ which was the 
vehicle to be used to achieve these changes - but focused somewhat narrowly on the activities 
related to writing and monitoring contracts (leading to criticisms that it has become a ‘paper 
chase’). 
 
‘Purchasing’ now appears to have gone out of fashion as it tends to be associated with the 
process of buying in a market-place, and ‘commissioning’ is the focus.  Whilst this may be 
seen merely as a change in language, it does seem to have been accompanied by a recognition 
that contracting - defined in terms of obtaining agreements about price, volume, quality and 
the flow of funds between purchasers and providers - is but one small part of the role of the 
commissioner or purchaser.  At the outset of the reforms, the level and quality of information 
available to facilitate the contracting process was very poor, and a great deal of resources and 
effort went into ensuring that appropriate information systems were in place to rectify this.  
There have been numerous attempts to improve methods of costing, pricing and defining 
services to allow purchasers to make sense of comparative information.  This has inevitably 
led to a focus on the detail of contracting, perhaps at the expense of the wider picture.   
 
It is only now that purchasers appear to feel that they can start to move away from the detail 
of contracting and focus more on what they term “service-driven” contracting: as purchasers 
in our survey stated, “contracts tend to be about columns of figures about activity and money 
and Patients’ Charter standards.....service agreements describe the service and what it does 
for people”, and  “contracting has tended to concentrate on the exchange of 
money....commissioning is about re-shaping, modelling and planning changes in service 
provision”.   Whilst this may have been the intention from the outset of the reforms, the 
amount of time purchasers have had to spend on developing the skills needed to ensure they 
can get contracts signed off each year appears to have dominated their activities for the past 
few years.  Now purchasers are viewing contracts as a much less important part of their role 
and are emphasising the need to use contracts as a tool in order to achieve the models of 
service they require:  “I might want to contract to achieve certain things at the end of year 
one [in relation to service reconfiguration].... but I am less and less interested in the amount 
of people going through the service”. 
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If this trend is continued into the future, we can expect to see more emphasis on defining the 
characteristics of the services required by local populations and less on  “bean-counting”, and 
a continued shift to service-based commissioning rather than concentrating on the detail of  
“counting and defining things to the ultimate degree” .  In pre-election speeches, the Labour 
Party also emphasised its wish to focus on commissioning rather than purchasing, which 
included moving to 3-5 year ‘agreements’ between primary care commissioning groups and 
mainly local hospitals,  based on definitions of the services required by patients and relating 
them to programmes of care.  Although it is not clear whether the current SoS will stand by 
the pre-election promises to reduce the number of contracts to one-tenth of the current level, 
if achieved, this might also support a shift away from the detail of the contracting process if it 
were to involve more standardised contract documentation. Additionally, the use of longer-
term agreements may be one way of facilitating strategic change which requires several years 
to achieve. 
 
Clearly it is essential that the contracting process is recognised as a means to an end rather 
than an end in itself, but it may be unwise to go too far in the other direction and dismiss 
contracts as unimportant.  In addition to requiring some sort of mechanism to manage the 
flow of resources between purchasers and providers, contracts have served a useful purpose in 
focusing attention on the need to define and measure quality, understand prices and think 
about the service rather than about institutions.  As one purchaser put it, “Most services have 
improved since contracting came in:  not necessarily because of the process of contracting 
but because we have focused on the service delivery and it has become part of the dialogue.... 
about setting specifications and monitoring [and] assessing delivery.  Purely and simply, the 
focus on services has led to improvements.” 
 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Contracting in the NHS has undergone significant development since the outset of the NHS 
reforms and we have shown how the features of the broader environment of the NHS 
managed market have influenced both the detailed procedural aspects of contracting and the 
nature of the relationships governing contracting.  Contracting can be viewed as fulfilling 
both the ‘competing by managing’ and the ‘managing by competing’ functions in the NHS, to 
varying degrees and in different circumstances.    
 
The future direction of contracting will of course depend on how (or if) the current 
government intends to implement its pre-election commitment to longer-term agreements 
with local providers. Whatever happens to the process of contracting per se, the movement 
towards a more strategic approach to commissioning is perhaps inevitable and long overdue.  
As this develops, contracting will still play an important role in mediating the flow of 
resources, but it will be just one component of a wider picture.  As one purchaser noted: “for 
too long [contracting] has been out on its own.  It should be the back end of a process and the 
front end should be the strategy”.  Additionally, the more recent emphasis on co-operative 
and collaborative relationships is likely to be reinforced by the present government, whilst the 
role of contracting as a means of promoting competition will be played down.  The challenge 
for the new government does not lie in re-inventing contracting, not least because the process 
of evolution towards longer-term collaborative arrangements had started long before the new 
government came into power.  What will have to be tackled, however, is how poor provider 
performance can be addressed in the context of such agreements. 
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